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Abstract. Motivated by both economic and political objectives, Brazil has been pursuing, in recent years, different 
trade arrangements in an attempt to reinforce strategic impulses for economic development. In this paper, alternative 
strategies of economic integration are evaluated from the Brazilian perspective. Traditional trade gains and losses are 
considered in a cost-competitiveness approach, based on relative changes in the industrial cost and demand 
structures. In the first part of the analysis, a national computable general equilibrium model is used in order to assess 
the first-round impacts of three alternative trade liberalization scenarios. The main findings indicate that general 
trade agreements under WTO negotiations are preferable to either the implementation of a free trade area in the 
Americas or regional agreements involving Mercosur and the European Union. However, each trade arrangement 
would entail differential structural impacts that serve to different development purposes. In the second part, a 
Machlup-Goodwin-type interregional model is integrated to the CGE model in order to generate a top-down 
disaggregation of the national results. Spatial implications of the trade policies are assessed, showing that the trade 




Recent years have witnessed a wave of neoliberal policies in Brazil. Regionalism, starting with 
the Mercosur Agreement in the early 1990s, and extended to broader regional trade agreements, 
still under negotiation, is a major element of the process of liberalization of the Brazilian 
economy. Motivated by both economic and political objectives, the country has been pursuing 
different strategies of regional integration in an attempt to reinforce strategic impulses for 
economic development.  
 
Taking the lead in the negotiations concerning the future of Mercosur, Brazil foresees three main 
alternatives for the development of economic trading blocs. First, the country is involved in the 
creation of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (Ftaa), keeping up with the process initiated in 
the 1994 Summit of the Americas to integrate the economies of the Western Hemisphere into a 
single free trade arrangement. Second, an agreement connecting the Mercosur countries and the 
European Union has already received the political compromise of the interested parts, but its 
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implementation still faces localized disagreements. Finally, a broader negotiation under the 
WTO (Millennium Round) has also to be considered.  
 
In the period 1997-1999, Brazilian main trade partners included countries in the Ftaa, with 
imports from Nafta and Mercosur reaching, respectively, 27% and 15% of the country’s total 
imports, while exports to these areas altogether represented around 39% of Brazilian total 
exports. The European Union also accounted for a considerable share of Brazil’s international 
trade, with around 28% of both exports and imports. This pattern, however, was very 
differentiated across the different Brazilian states (Table 1). 
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Table 1. Direction of Trade: Exports and Imports, by Destination and Origin:  
Brazilian States, 1997-1999 (in %) 
 
 Mercosur  Nafta  Rest  of  Ftaa 
 
E.U. Rest  of  the 
World 
Region/State Exp Imp Exp Imp Exp Imp Exp Imp Exp Imp 
            
North  5  1  17 26  5  5  36 14 36 54 
AC  17 4 32  86  32 0 13 9  6  1 
AP  4 0 9  18  6 6  34  45  48  31 
AM  27 1 18  25  29 4  9 13  18  56 
PA  2 10  17  41 1 10  40  24  39  15 
RO  20 8 28  23 7 21  25  12  20  36 
RR  0  0  0  2  50 74 22 20 29  4 
TO  1 28  37 4  0  0 52  26  10  42 
            
Northeast  14 17 29 22  4  14 25 17 29 29 
AL  2 24  26  23 1  0 10  12  62  41 
BA  18 13 28 23  5  18 25 12 24 34 
CE  14 28 52 19  6  13 11 16 17 25 
MA  7  4 21  23 0 29  43  29  29  16 
PB  16 18 40 14  6  1  20 28 18 39 
PE  15  22  22  22 8 11 2 18  54  27 
PI  3  9  31 29  3  4  48 17 16 41 
RN  10 8 29  27 6  2 36  23  19  40 
SE  26 41 15 22  8  1  49 24  2  13 
            
Southeast  19 13 24 30 10  4  25 32 22 22 
ES  3 29  36  25 3  4 28  17  30  25 
MG  10 22 20 19  4  4  38 44 28 12 
RJ  18 10 26 32 15  2  17 27 24 28 
SP  24 10 25 31 13  4  20 33 19 22 
            
South  15 33 19 18  6  3  31 28 29 19 
PR  11  29 8 17 5  3 42  34  34  17 
SC  16 28 23 19  8  3  27 32 25 19 
RS  18 38 26 18  7  3  24 20 26 21 
            
Midwest  6 15 5 34 3  3 57  24  28  23 
DF  1 2 4  46  1 1 1  38  93  13 
GO  6 34  14  19 2  6 56  15  22  26 
MT  2 11 1 43 4  1 61  14  33  31 
MS  22  18 2 24 4  4 51 8 21  46 
            
Brazil  17 15 22 27  8  4  28 29 25 24 
                    Source: Ministry of Development, Industry and Trade (authors’ elaboration) 
 
Table 2 reveals a spatially uneven regional distribution of international trade in the country. The 
Southeast and South regions were responsible for 84% of Brazil’s total exports, and 85% of total 
imports in the 1997-1999 period. When one looks at bloc-specific trade flows, the Southeast 
region was responsible for more than half of total trade with the five groups considered. The state 
of São Paulo alone concentrated the country’s exports, with a share of 57% in the total sales to 
the rest of the Ftaa, and 54% in the sales to other Mercosur countries.    4
 
 
Table 2. State Share in Total Brazilian Exports and Imports,  
by Destination and Origin, 1997-1999 (in %) 
 
  Mercosur  Nafta  Rest of Ftaa  E.U.  Rest of the 
World 
Total 
Region/State  Exp Imp Exp Imp Exp Imp Exp Imp Exp Imp Exp Imp 
              
North  2 1 4 6 3 7 7 3 8  15  5 7 
AC  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
AP  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
AM  1 0 0 6 2 6 0 3 0  14  1 6 
PA  1 0 4 1 1 1 7 0 7 0 5 0 
RO  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
RR  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
TO  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
              
Northeast  6 8  10  6 4  23  7 4 9 8 8 7 
AL  0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
BA  4 2 5 2 2  11  3 1 3 4 4 3 
CE  1 2 2 1 1 3 0 1 1 1 1 1 
MA  1 0 1 1 0 4 2 1 2 0 1 1 
PB  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
PE  1 2 1 1 1 4 0 1 1 2 1 2 
PI  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
RN  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
SE  0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
              
Southeast  67 57 62 76 71 57 51 76 50 63 58 69 
ES  0  12  3 6 1 5 2 4 2 6 2 6 
MG  9  9 13 4  7  5 20 9 16 3 15 6 
RJ  4 6 4  10  6 4 2 8 3  10  4 8 
SP  54 31 42 56 57 42 27 55 28 44 37 48 
              
South  24 33 23 10 20 12 29 15 30 12 26 16 
PR  6 12 3  4  5  5 14 8 12 5  9  7 
SC  5 4 6 1 5 1 6 2 6 2 6 2 
RS  13  17  14 5 10 5 10 5 12 6 12 7 
              
Midwest  1 2 1 2 1 1 6 1 3 2 3 2 
DF  0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
GO  0 1 1 0 0 1 2 0 1 1 1 1 
MT  0 0 0 0 1 0 4 0 2 0 2 0 
MS  1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
                   
Brazil  100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
              Source: Ministry of Development, Industry and Trade (authors’ elaboration) 
 
Recent research on trade and location has proposed different approaches to analyze the effects of 
globalization on industrial location.
1 Considering its two main driving forces – trade 
liberalization and technical progress – the globalization process is responsible for important shifts 
in the economic centers of gravity not only in the world economy but also within the national 
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economies. In the latter case, the question one poses addresses equity concerns: are regional 
inequalities likely to widen or narrow? Although it is agreed that there is inherent 
unpredictability created by some of the forces involved, the research agenda seeks to use new 
techniques to illuminate at least some of the forces at work reshaping the economic geography of 
the world and provide an empirical work to quantify these forces (Venables, 1998). In this paper 
we focus on the regional impacts of one of these driving forces in a national economy. 
 
The effects of trade reforms have been extensively studied in the international trade literature. 
Trade liberalization processes are said to have long-run economic benefits derived from gains in 
the production side and the consumption side, as well as non-economic benefits (Devlin and 
French-Davis, 1997, and Whalley, 1997). However, the trade liberalization process also involves 
two kinds of short-run costs to the economy: distributional costs (protected sectors tend to lose), 
and balance of payments pressures due to the rapid increase in imports (Bruno, 1987). These 
costs, which can be considered the “first-round” impacts of a trade liberalization process, can be 
perceived in a time span long enough for local prices of imports to fully adjust to tariff changes, 
for major import users to decide whether or not to switch to domestic suppliers, for domestic 
suppliers to hire labor and to expand output with their existing plant, for new investment plans to 
be made but not completed, and for price increases to be passed onto wages and wage increases 
passed back to prices (Dixon et al. , 1982).  
 
In the Brazilian case, the impacts of trade liberalization, in general, and regional integration, in 
particular, have been assessed in different contexts.
2 Partial equilibrium studies have focused on 
the impacts of regional integration on trade flows related to Brazil’s international trade (Carvalho 
and Parente, 1999, Maciente, 2000). Although data requirements are relatively low, these studies 
generate detailed information on product-specific trade flows. However, they fail to recognize 
that regional integration is a complex general equilibrium phenomenon, producing biased 
estimates. 
 
Other attempts to assess the impacts of trade liberalization policies in Brazil have considered the 
general equilibrium approach. Most of them addressed issues related to Mercosur policies with 
gentle methodological twists (Campos-Filho, 1998, Flores, 1997); others also looked at unilateral 
liberalization issues and their implications for resource allocation (Haddad, 1999, Haddad and   6
 
Azzoni, 2001, Campos-Filho, 1998). The common feature of these studies refers to the timing of 
the analysis: they all consider benchmarks at the early stages of the liberalization process, 
precluding the further analysis of the process of regional integration. In order to fill this gap, 
taking as the benchmark a more recent year, a cost-competitiveness approach methodology is 
developed in this paper in order to evaluate new initiatives of trade arrangements.
3 We examine 
three alternative strategies of regional integration for Brazil reflecting its basic degree of intensity 
(Bowen  et al., 1998). Potential free trade areas are explored, in which member countries 
eliminate tariffs among themselves but maintain individual tariff schedules on imports for non-
member countries. Moreover, we also consider their spatial implications for the national 
economy.  
 
The discussion of regional impacts of trade arrangements on the Brazilian economy has often 
lacked a formal analytical framework. The debate has often focused on sectoral implications 
considering economy-wide effects (Flores Jr., 1997; Campos-Filho, 1998; Gonzaga et al., 1999). 
The few incursions on sub-national issues have not gone further than exercises of well-educated 
speculation, nor presented an integrated interregional framework, treating the regions as isolated 
entities in aspatial dimensions. To close this gap, this study also includes a  Machlup-Goodwin-
type interregional model to analyze the short-run regional effects of specific trade policies. The 
model produces estimates for the 27 Brazilian states, using a top-down disaggregation of the 
national results. By using the results to evaluate changes in the economic gravity center, it is 
shown that the integration strategies examined are likely to generate geographical shifts towards 




The specification of linkages between the national and regional economy represents an 
interesting theoretical issue in regional modeling. Two basic approaches are prevalent – top-
down and bottom-up –, and the choice between them usually reflects a trade-off between 
theoretical sophistication and data requirements. 
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The top-down approach consists of the disaggregation of national results to regional levels, on 
an ad hoc basis. The disaggregation can proceed in different steps (e.g. country-state →  state-
municipality), enhancing a very fine level of regional divisions.
4 The desired adding-up property 
in a multi-step procedure is that, at each stage, the disaggregated projections have to be consistent 
with the results at the immediately higher level. The starting point of top-down models is 
economy-wide projections. The mapping to regional dimensions occurs without feedback from 
the region; in this sense, effects of policies originating in the regions are precluded. In accordance 
with the lack of theoretical refinement in terms of modeling the behavior of regional agents, most 
top-down models are not as data demanding as bottom-up models. 
 
In the bottom-up approach, agents’ behavior is explicitly modeled at the regional level. A fully 
interdependent system is specified in which national-regional feedback may occur in both 
directions. Thus, analysis of policies originating at the regional level is facilitated. The adding-up 
property is fully recognized, since national results are obtained from the aggregation of regional 
results. In order to make such highly sophisticated theoretical models operational, data 
requirements are very demanding. To start with, an interregional input-output database is usually 
required, with full specification of interregional flows. Data also include interregional trade 
elasticities and other regional parameters, for which econometric estimates are rarely available in 
the literature. 
 
The strategy adopted in this paper utilizes a national computable general equilibrium model 
integrated to an interstate model to evaluate geographical shifts in the economic structure and 
regional specialization in the Brazilian economy due to different strategies of economic 
integration. The remainder of the paper is organized in four sections and an appendix. First, after 
this introduction, an overview of the CGE model to be used in the simulations (EFES-IT) is 
presented, focusing on its general features. Second, a Machlup-Goodwin-type interstate model, 
which will be integrated to the CGE model to generate the state projections, is introduced. After 
that, the simulation experiment is designed and implemented, and the main results are discussed. 
Final remarks follow in an attempt to evaluate our findings and put them into perspective, 
considering their extension and limitations. An Appendix containing the full specification of the 
CGE model is also presented. 
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2. The  EFES-IT  Model 
 
In order to evaluate the short-run (“first-round”) effects of alternative trade agreements involving 
Brazil, a national computable general equilibrium model was developed and implemented 
(EFES-IT). The structure of the model represents an extension of the EFES model (Haddad and 
Domingues, 2001), which focuses on the disaggregation of its external sector. EFES is a forward-
looking CGE model for the Brazilian economy, specified to run both comparative-static and 
forecast simulations. Its theoretical structure departs from the prototype CGE model presented in 
Dixon and Parmenter (1996).  
 
The model identifies 42 sectors and 80 commodities, 2 margin commodities (trade and 
transportation services), 3 types of indirect taxes, and 5 different groups of users (producers, 
investors, households, foreigners, and “other demands”, which includes government). In its 
extension, the EFES-IT model, special attention was given to the specification of international 
flows. The external sector was disaggregated into five different components related to different 
trade blocs, namely, Mercosur, Nafta, rest of Ftaa, European Union, and rest of the world. It 
enabled the capability of assessing policy effects related to changes in the structure and 
determinants of bilateral trade flows referring to the Brazilian economy. 
 
The mathematical structure of EFES-IT is based on the MONASH Model for the Australian 
economy. It qualifies as a Johansen-type model in that the solutions are obtained by solving the 
system of linearized equations of the model. A typical result shows the percentage change in the 
set of endogenous variables, after a policy is carried out, compared to their values in the absence 
of such policy, in a given environment. The schematic presentation of Johansen solutions for 
such models is standard in the literature. More details can be found in Dixon et al. (1982, 1992), 
Harrison and Pearson (1994, 1996), and Dixon and Parmenter (1996). 
 
Closure 
   9
 
EFES-IT contains 81,048 equations and 87,841 variables. Thus, to close the model, 6,793 
variables have to be set exogenously.
5 In order to capture the first-round effects of each 
integration agreement, the simulations were carried out under a standard short-run closure, which 
considers, from the supply side, fixed capital stocks and given technology, and, from the demand 
side, exogenously defined domestic absorption.  
 
3. The Model of Interstate Flows  
 
The development of the Model of Interstate Trade Flows (MIST) follows Haddad et al. (1999).  
However, while the latter paper deals with countries in a global economy, in the present context, 
attention is directed to interactions between states within a national economy. Consider the 
following balance identity, which is applicable for each state i (i = 1, ..., n) in the national 
economy: 
i i i i i i GRP IMP GOV INV HHC EXP + ≡ + + +                   (1) 
where:  
i i i i GOV INV HHC EXP + + + = total production of state i                          (2)  
i i GRP IMP + = total expenditures of  state i                          (3)  
and, HHC, INV, GOV, EXP and IMP are  private consumption, investment, government 
expenditures, exports and imports in state i, respectively. EXP and IMP are composed by both 
domestic and external flows, that is, they incorporate interregional flows and foreign trade.  
 






i ij i WEXP exp r EXP
1





i ij i WIMP rimp IMP
1
                       ( 5 )  
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The  ij rexp s are the sales of state i to state j and  i WEXP s are the foreign exports of state i.  In a 
similar way, the  ij rimp s are purchases (imports) of state i from state j and  i WIMP  are foreign 
imports by state i.  The interregional flows matrices [ ij rexp ] and [ ij rimp ] are the same.  
 
Substituting (4) and (5) into (1):  
∑ ∑
= =
+ + = + + + +
n
j
i i ij i i i
n
j
i ij GRP WIMP rimp GOV INV HHC WEXP rexp
1 1
= j E   
for i = 1,..., n.                                    (6) 
where  j E  is the total expenditure of state i.  
 
Given these definitions, we can propose the design of matrices of interstate trade, that present 
structural similarities to the closed-economy input-output tables.
6 The result will be an input-
output-type table in which the rows describe the distribution of a state’s domestic production 
throughout the national economy plus foreign exports 
( i i i
n
j
i ij GOV INV HHC WEXP rexp + + + + ∑
= 1
), while the columns reveal the composition of a state 




i i ij GRP WIMP rimp
1
). The mathematical 
structure of the system consists of a set of n linear equations with n unknowns. In similar fashion 
to input-output systems, the solutions are straightforward mathematically. 
 
The system of n equations can be written in matrix notation as: 
 
TZ + FD = Z                         ( 7 )    
 
where:  
                                                           
6 The basic data used to construct the matrix include estimates of interstate flows, gross regional product (GRP) and 
total production, by state.    11
T is the interstate import coefficients matrix (n x n), Z is the total production vector (n x 1) and 
FD is the final demand vector (n x 1). 
 
Solving (7) yields: 
FD ) T I ( Z
1 − − =                         ( 8 )  
which is the relevant equation for the forthcoming analysis. 
   12
4. Simulations  Results
7 
 
In this section, the main results from the simulations are presented. The basic experiment 
consisted of the evaluation of three alternative scenarios: a) implementation of the Ftaa; b) 
implementation of a free trade area including Mercosur and European Union countries; and c) 
generalized bilateral agreements involving Brazil and its trade partners.
8 Only tariff barriers were 
considered. Calibrated estimates of bloc-product-specific tariff rates for the benchmark year 
relied on data compiled by the IADB and Castilho (2000). In each simulation, tariffs related to 
each individual bilateral flow were abolished. As the economies of the Brazilian trade partners 
are not explicitly modeled in a general equilibrium context
9, a vector of subsidies to Brazilian 
exports was estimated so that a zero-tariff-equivalent reduction in their prices could be 
implemented. In terms of the model variables, listed in the Appendix, shocks were given in both 
the appropriate 
) 0 (




i f ’s. 
 
The Big Picture: Macro Results 
 
Table 3 summarizes the results of the three simulations for some macro variables. Although real 
GDP effects are rather small (less than 1%), they do present a well-defined hierarchy: regarding 
GDP growth, a general trade agreement under WTO negotiations is preferable to a regional 
agreement involving Mercosur and the European Union, which is preferable to the 
implementation of a free trade area in the Americas. The same hierarchy is verified when one 
looks at employment effects. However, a clear trade-off between employment level and national 
real wage is apparent.  
 
The labor market results, combined with the ones for the rate of return on capital, reflect two 
characteristics of the experiment. First, as either one of the integration strategies is shown to have 
a positive impact in the Brazilian economy, under a short-run closure, the capital/labor ratio of 
the economy decreases making labor (capital) relatively less (more) productive. Second, there 
appears a Stolper-Samuelson-type effect. A closer look at the benchmark tariff schedule reveals a 
relative concentration of high-tariff products related to labor-intensive sectors. As tariffs vanish, 
with fixed capital stocks, capital becomes better off.   
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Table 3. Impact on Selected Macro Variables (in %) 
 Ftaa  EU  All 
Real GDP  0.14  0.24  0.61 
Aggregate employment  0.26  0.47  1.19 
GDP deflator  -0.57  -1.64  -3.73 
Real wage  -0.10  -0.93  -1.84 
Rate of return on capital  0.54  0.88  2.28 
Volume of exports  4.13  4.64  13.35 
Volume of imports  1.72  0.82  3.47 
 
Direction of Trade 
 
Aggregate effects on import and export volumes point to a favorable movement towards trade 
surplus, as exports grow at a faster pace. Part of the reduced effects on imports can be explained 
by trade diversion. From Table 4, it is noticeable the change in the composition of the Brazilian 
imports in the three scenarios. In the Ftaa case, imports from Nafta and rest of Ftaa countries 
grow at a rate above 6%. However, imports originated in Mercosur countries, European Union, 
and the rest of the world decrease. The estimated trade diversion is close to USD 340 million, 
from which 45.3% refer to reductions in imports of European products, and 9.5% refer to imports 
of Mercosur products. 
 
In the European Union scenario, it is apparent trade diversion towards European products, as 
these products become less expensive than similar goods from outside the free trade area. In this 
case, the estimated trade diversion is higher, accounting for USD 612 million. Noteworthy is the 
share of Nafta products in this total, which reaches 49.5%. 
 
These results suggest that European Union and Nafta countries (read USA) play major roles in 
the first two strategies examined. If, on one hand, the implementation of a free trade area in the 
Americas benefits American exports to Brazil against European exports, on the other hand, an 
agreement with the European Union would revert this situation in favor of European products, 
causing a reduction in the market share of American products in the Brazilian domestic market. 
As it is evident, this result carries political implications that might not be neglected. It has been 
pointed out elsewhere that one of the objectives of trade arrangements is to increase multilateral 
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bargaining power (Whalley, 1997). Thinking prospectively, Mercosur seems to have been 
serving this purpose. 
 
Table 4. Impact on Brazilian Imports by Origin (in %) 
Ftaa EU All
Mercosur -0.29 -0.21 -1.10
Nafta 6.21 -1.21 4.05
Rest of Ftaa 6.69 -0.44 5.38
EU -0.68 5.76 4.15












Under different trade arrangements, specific changes in the direction of Brazilian exports are 
likely to emerge. Table 5 reveals some of these changes, showing that, in the Ftaa scenario, 
exports to Nafta and rest of Ftaa countries grow at the expense of exports to other world markets; 
in the EU scenario, exports to Europe grow faster than those directed to Ftaa countries; and, in 
the All scenario, exports growth tends to be more evenly distributed, with better performances in 
the rest of Ftaa markets, followed by EU and rest of the world. 
  
Table 5. Impact on Brazilian Exports by Destination (in %) 
Ftaa EU All
Mercosur -0.04 1.15 1.92
Nafta 8.80 0.63 9.83
Rest of Ftaa 26.24 1.34 28.57
EU -0.15 16.68 16.03















This brings about important structural changes in the national economy, as different patterns of 
direction of trade imply different compositions of trade flows. The inspection of more detailed 
information – not shown here – on the impact on trade flows from Brazil to five different trade 
blocs, under the three scenarios, suggests that:  
 
a)  In the case of the implementation of the Ftaa, two distinct effects appear: first, the 
positive results for the exports to Nafta are concentrated in traditional products, such as 
products in the textile and food sectors; second, the good performance of Brazilian   15
exports to rest of Ftaa countries shows a more diversified pattern, presenting significant 
results not only for traditional products, but also to more elaborated manufacturing 
products. 
b)  The trade arrangement with the European Union would have a positive impact on the 
Brazilian exports, concentrated in agriculture products and textile and food industry 
products.  
c)  The effects of a generalized bilateral agreement involving Brazil and its trade partners on 
Brazilian exports would be more balanced in relation to the composition of the export list. 
The destination of the products with the better performance reveals the existing protection 
schedule: the European market tends to absorb agriculture and food industry products to a 
greater extent, while Ftaa countries receives more manufactures. 
 
As will be seen, these results heavily influence sectoral activity outcomes. When one looks at 
results for the main products in the Brazilian export list, concentrated in primary and intermediate 
goods, the Ftaa strategy appears to be more favorable to higher value-added products, directed 
mostly to the less developed countries of the region. A similar movement is apparent from the 
general trade arrangement. The positive Ftaa effects over Brazilian exports to Nafta, however, 
concentrate in lower value-added products. In the case of an arrangement with Europe, there 
would also be relative gains in the performance of exports of traditional products with localized 




Finally, one has to put the trade flow results into perspective. Given the closure adopted in our 
simulations, in which the components of the domestic absorption are set exogenously, the trade 
balance results will be important to generate the activity level results. The aforementioned results 
will depend not only on the performance of product-specific exports and imports, but also on 
each industry’s external dependency. Table 6 summarizes the impacts on the activity level of 
different sectoral components of GDP. Noteworthy is the fact that, under the Ftaa scenario, the 
industrial sector would be the main “winner”, while, under the EU scenario, agriculture would be 
the most benefited sector. In the All scenario, however, gains from integration would be more 
evenly distributed across sectors.  
   16
Table 6. Impact on Sectoral GDP Components (in %) 
 Ftaa  EU  All 
Agriculture  0.08 0.47 0.97 
Industry  0.34 0.37 1.14 
   Extractive  0.00  0.69  1.07 
   Manufacturing  0.44  0.46  1.44 
      Nonmetallic minerals  0.32  0.17  0.72 
      Metallurgy  0.82  0.43  2.04 
      Machinery  0.16  0.16  0.54 
      Transportation equipment  1.07  0.59  2.42 
      Chemicals  0.14  0.28  0.74 
      Textile, clothing and shoes  1.37  0.70  2.53 
      Food  0.10  0.56  1.35 
      Other manufacturing  0.46  0.70  1.79 
Services  0.07 0.19 0.44 
   Construction  0.00  0.01  0.02 
   Electric, gas and sanitary services  0.16  0.29  0.73 
   Trade  0.12  0.22  0.53 
   Transportation  0.41  1.14  2.59 
   Communication  0.10  0.24  0.58 
   Financial institutions  0.05  0.10  0.26 
   Other services  0.05  0.24  0.52 
   Real estate  0.00  0.02  0.04 
   Public administration  0.00  0.00  0.00 
 
Kaleidoscope Analysis: State-Level Disaggregation 
 
The Brazilian economy is highly concentrated in geographical terms. The state of São Paulo, 
with only 2.9 % of territory, hosts 35.3% of national GDP and 21.7% of population; the 
Northeast region, with 28.5% of national population and 18.3% of national territory, produces 
only 13.5% of national GDP (1996 figures). Starting in 1939, when state GDP statistics started 
being calculated, there was a clear trend towards regional concentration in the Southeast until the 
mid-1970s. From then on, some signs of polarization reversal were present, leading some 
analysts to predict the future deconcentration of the national production (Diniz, 1994; Azzoni, 
2001). Since financial problems affecting the data collection agencies precluded the production 
of updated regional GDP figures, this belief remained in all analysis of regional concentration in 
Brazil until recently. However, new data released indicate that reconcentration took place after 
the mid-1980s, relating to production restructuring, the liberalization of the national economy, 
the weakening of the public sector (downgrading all kinds of regional policies), the creation of a 
free trade area with Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay, etc.  
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Although some sectors presented higher than average growth in the Northeast, mainly non-
durable consumption goods, the traditional industrial area was able to keep and even increase its 
share in national GDP. The expected deconcentration is taking place mainly among the 
neighboring states of São Paulo, the richest state in the country, despite the development of 
resource-oriented activities (agriculture, agribusiness, mining) in the Midwest and North regions 
of the country. The neighboring states of São Paulo, Paraná and Minas Gerais, in the South and 
Southeast, together sum up to over 50% of total GDP; in manufacturing, their share sums up to 
over 67%, and it does not seem to be falling (data for 1997).  
 
Although explicit regional policies were almost absent in the last two decades, macroeconomic 
(five stabilization plans after 1986; undervalued exchange rate between 1994 and 1998) and 
sectoral policies (a large scale incentive program for the production of alcohol as fuel, for 
example) were very active, producing regional consequences. It is of interest of this section to 
focus on the spatial implications of special trade arrangements. 
 
The results described in the previous section are very relevant for the understanding of an 
integrated economic system. The CGE model produces results only at the national level, fully 
recognizing the general equilibrium nature of economic interdependence and the fact that the 
policy impacts in various commodity markets differ. However, in the Brazilian federalism, states 
play an important role, and, thus, for many policy purposes state disaggregation may be required. 
In order to meet such needs, under conditions of limited information at the state level, a top-down 
disaggregation scheme is suggested and implemented. It takes EFES-IT national results as an 
input and produces results for each of the 27 Brazilian states. 
 
The method proposed here can be summarized in six different steps: 1) use EFES-IT to project 
economy-wide and sectoral effects of the exogenous shock; 2) decompose  i EXP  (foreign exports 
of state i) into 80 products and 5 destinations; 3) allocate the national results obtained for each 
commodity-destination export flow without respect to its geographical origin; 4) generate 
i EXP ∆ , for every state i; 5) determine gross activity effects for each state; 6) scale gross 
projections to ensure that the adding-up restrictions hold. 
 
Data requirements for the implementation of this top-down methodology include a minimal 
amount of data. Estimates of the interstate trade matrix for the benchmark year and the   18
disaggregation of state foreign trade flows by product and origin/destination are the main piece of 
information needed.  
 
National results are regionalized through the use of the MIST. Given the economic structure in 
1997, we should estimate a vector of changes  FD ∆ , related to equation (8), in percentage change 
form: 
 
FD ) T I ( Z ∆ − = ∆
− 1                         ( 9 )  
 
FD ∆ is the vector of changes in the final demand, and, in our simulations, it represents the state 
impacts on exports from the different trade strategies.
10 These impacts are calculated from the 
prevailing export structure in each state in the benchmark year and the percentage change in the 
export of each product to each of the five destinations estimated by the national CGE model. 
Table 7 presents the results for  FD ∆ , used in each of the three simulations. A communication 
channel between the national model and the interstate model is built through the use of adding-up 
restrictions of the top-down disaggregation results, requiring consistency of injections and 
leakages. 
  
Table 7. Estimated Impact on Export Volumes –  FD ∆ : 
Brazilian States (in %) 
 Ftaa  E.U. All 
AC 6.07  0.90  10.06 
AL 1.99  2.56  12.13 
AP 1.86  4.11  11.82 
AM 5.91 3.53  12.50 
BA 4.75  4.15  12.50 
CE 9.93  1.83  12.83 
DF 0.63  0.87  12.85 
ES 2.51  1.81  6.58 
GO  1.58 13.92 17.80 
MA 0.37 0.79 7.65 
MT  0.40 14.83 18.16 
MS  0.31 10.71 13.66 
MG 2.48 3.39 8.84 
PA 1.17  3.12  8.15 
PB 9.08  5.00  19.61 
PR  1.93 10.21 17.00 
PE 5.55  4.23  15.38 
PI 2.87  6.68  11.88 
                                                           
10 Recall that the components of the domestic absorption are set exogenously.   19
RN  4.22 11.97 18.94 
RS 7.42  4.80  18.73 
RJ 6.23  2.49  12.59 
RO 3.30  3.79  12.07 
RR 9.08  1.81  23.28 
SC 4.26  7.87  22.22 
SP 6.20  4.38  14.51 
SE 9.38  9.82  20.75 
TO  6.21 12.46 18.06 
 
 
Exports of peripheral states, in general, tend to gain relative position in the national export list. 
Among the states with better results in each of the trade strategies, it is noteworthy the 
performance of states playing a secondary role in Brazil’s international trade: a) Ftaa – Ceará, 
Sergipe, Paraíba e Roraima; b) EU – Mato Grosso, Goiás, Tocantins, Rio Grande do Norte e 
Mato Grosso; c) All – Roraima, Sergipe, Paraíba e Rio Grande do Norte. However, the exports 
from these states rely heavily on primary products, or manufactures with low technological 
content. It should also be mentioned that the states located in the more dynamic regions of the 
Southeast and South, with greater penetration in international markets, present satisfactory 
performance occupying intermediate positions.  
 
The results in Table 8 show that, from the spatial point of view, the three strategies generate 
concentration of the economic activity. Although the export effects of the less developed states 
are relatively higher, three factors contribute to a better overall performance of the economies of 
the Southeast and South: a) higher value-added content in the exports by the states in the region; 
b) higher degree of trade openness of the state economies of the South and Southeast regions, 
which gives exports a relatively more prominent role in the growth process; and c) the pattern of 
interregional integration at the sub-national level and the operation of feedback effects, as the 
state interdependence generates leakages from the less developed to the more developed regions.  
 
Table 8. Impact on Activity Level: 
Brazilian States (in %) 
 Ftaa  E.U. All 
AC 0.04  0.05  0.14 
AL 0.09  0.11  0.45 
AP 0.06  0.12  0.35 
AM 0.20  0.17  0.52 
BA 0.19  0.17  0.51 
CE 0.17  0.06  0.28 
DF 0.01  0.02  0.05   20
ES 0.19  0.17  0.52 
GO 0.07  0.24  0.40 
MA 0.04  0.07  0.49 
MS 0.09  0.78  1.09 
MT 0.07  0.26  0.44 
MG 0.20  0.25  0.66 
PA 0.14  0.34  0.88 
PB 0.08  0.06  0.19 
PR 0.18  0.58  1.08 
PE 0.07  0.06  0.20 
PI 0.04  0.07  0.15 
RN 0.07  0.14  0.26 
RS 0.45  0.33  1.19 
RJ 0.12  0.08  0.30 
RO 0.05  0.08  0.19 
RR 0.04  0.03  0.12 
SC 0.29  0.47  1.31 
SP 0.30  0.26  0.78 
SE 0.08  0.10  0.24 
TO 0.04  0.07  0.14 
 
 
5.  Final Remarks: The Moving Picture 
 
The previous analysis provides important insights into the debate on regional inequality in a 
developing country. The simulations have supported the argument that the strategies for 
economic integration pursued by the Brazilian government are very likely to increase regional 
inequality in the country. Moreover, they call the attention to a phenomenon that permeates this 
debate: the role of trade as an engine to growth. The relationship between trade and growth has 
been a familiar topic of discussion in the development literature. More often, the question posed 
concerns the effects of international trade on economic growth, and thus focuses on trade as an 
active “agent” of growth. This active role played by international trade can be found in many 
different models. Todaro (1994) concludes that trade can be an important stimulus to rapid 
economic growth, although it might not be a desirable strategy for economic and social 
development. The contribution to development depends on the nature of the export sector, the 
distribution of its benefits, and the sector’s linkages with the rest of the economy. It seems that, 
to the extent we are only interested in the effects of international trade on pure economic growth, 
there is a consensus that trade can provide an important stimulus to growth. At the sub-national 
level, the export base theory provides the foundations to different models of regional 
development. 
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Recently, however, given the focus on globalization issues and the implicit assumption that a 
region’s economic future is inextricably tied with its ability to compete in the international export 
market, international trade has attracted the attention of regional analysts as well. As it has been 
shown, in the Brazilian case, its relevance is noticeable in only a few states. Would the other 
states be fated to an archaic structure of trade, based on the export of less elaborated products 
directed to specific markets? Would the likely regional concentration pattern of international 
trade flows be irreversible, once liberalization points to the strengthening of this phenomenon?     
 
To our understanding, the answers to both questions are negative. Firstly, one should consider the 
contemporary trend towards the broadening of trade agreements involving Brazil – in which the 
gradual reduction in trade restrictions with more extensive geographical areas is seek  –, as a 
complex dynamic general equilibrium process, whose effects expand in the long run. The process 
of regional integration includes issues that relate growth to technology, learning, externalities, 
political economy and political agreements (Devlin e French-Davis, 1997). In this sense, its 
repercussion in the sub-national space can be redirected by public policies. At today’s stage of 
development of the Brazilian economy, the interplay of market forces is likely to concentrate 
economic activity in the Center-South
11, but there is still room for government intervention in 
order to attenuate the effects of this market failure. It is necessary, however, that guidelines to 
regional planning be established aiming at the efficient use of the potentiality of the peripheral 
regions and the creation and consolidation of dynamic comparative advantages in the regions.  
 
Secondly, the role of interregional trade to the state economies should not be relegated to a 
secondary place. One should consider interstate interactions for a better understanding of how the 
state economies are affected, both in the international and in the domestic markets, once for the 
smaller economies, the performance of the more developed regions plays a crucial role. As 
Anderson and Hewings (1999) observe, the usual region versus the rest of the world 
characterization of spatial interaction provides a convenient mechanism to generate demand-
driven models, but it provides little insights into two properties associated with spatial interaction 
that have not featured prominently in regional models, namely, feedbacks and hierarchy. On one 
hand, interstate trade might generate the potential for the propagation of feedback effects that, in 
quantitative terms, could be larger than the effects generated by international trade. On the other 
hand, the impact of feedback effects will be determined, partly, by the hierarchical structure of   22
the interregional system under consideration. Thus, in the Brazilian case, it is expected that the 
impacts of interstate trade related to the São Paulo economy will differ from those from the other 
state economies. 
 
Inspection of Table 9 reveals some important characteristics of the Brazilian interregional 
system. It presents estimates of the interstate and international export coefficients for the 27 
Brazilian states. It is noteworthy that, for every state, interstate exports are higher than 
international exports. In general, interstate flows have higher relative importance to the less 
developed economies.
12 These estimates reveal, at first, the relevance of interstate trade for the 
regional economies. A further analysis of the trade among the Brazilian states, including the way 
of generalizations about the type of trade involved, its changing composition over time as an 
economy evolves and the implications for these structural differences in the articulation and 
implementation of development policies, would enhance the understanding of the economic 
system. 
 
Table 9. Interstate and International Export Coefficients: 
Brazilian States, 1997 
 





AC 25.7%  0.1%  460.8 
AL 30.8%  4.6%  6.6 
AP 5.3%  3.4%  1.5 
AM 87.7%  1.9%  45.8 
BA 30.5%  4.4%  6.9 
CE 28.9%  2.1%  13.7 
DF 10.4%  0.0%  301.6 
ES 90.2%  5.6%  16.0 
GO 52.6%  2.3%  22.9 
MA 13.1%  8.7%  1.5 
MT 76.5%  7.9%  9.7 
MS 41.6%  2.6%  16.0 
MG 57.5%  7.6%  7.6 
PA 14.5%  14.0%  1.0 
PB 27.5%  0.9%  30.2 
PR 59.1%  7.7%  7.7 
PE 31.2%  1.1%  27.9 
PI 13.5%  1.2%  10.9 
RN 23.8%  1.4%  16.5 
RS 36.1%  7.6%  4.7 
RJ 32.3%  1.6%  19.7 
                                                                       
11 See Haddad (1999). 
12 Exceptions include the states of Amapá, Maranhão and Pará, whose transportation and communication 
infrastructure systems were projected to facilitate exports of mineral products.   23
RO 17.6%  1.0%  18.0 
RR 13.8%  0.3%  39.7 
SC 61.7%  7.9%  7.8 
SP 49.0%  5.4%  9.0 
SE 39.1%  0.6%  65.9 
TO 20.5%  0.6%  36.7 
Source: (A) Confaz and IBGE; (B) MDIC and IBGE (authors’ elaboration) 
 
Finally, one could reach the conclusion that, for some of the state economies under consideration, 
the future is not only tied with its ability to compete in the international export market, but also 
with its articulation with other domestic markets. Again, more room for public policy might be 
advocated, through actions towards the modernization of the transportation infrastructure of the 
country to generate a more efficient integration of producers and consumers, and, thus, maximize 
the effects of the different strategies of trade policy: not only the mechanisms of propagation of 
feedback effects would be enhanced, but also the competitiveness of Brazilian products in 
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Appendix 
 
The functional forms of the main groups of equations of the CGE core are presented in this 
Appendix together with the definition of the main groups of variables, parameters and 
coefficients. 
 
The notational convention uses uppercase letters to represent the levels of the variables and 
lowercase for their percentage-change representation. Superscripts (u), u = 0, 1j, 2j, 3, 4b, 5, 
refer, respectively, to output (0) and to the five different users of the products identified in the 
model: producers in sector j (1j), investors in sector j (2j), households (3), purchasers of exports 
in region b (4b), and government and “other demands”  (5). Inputs are identified by two 
subscripts: the first takes the values 1, ..., g, for commodities, g + 1, for primary factors, and g + 
2, for “other costs” (basically, taxes and subsidies on production); the second subscript identifies 
the source of the input, being it domestic (1) or imported from region b (2b), or coming from 
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(A3) Substitution between labor and capital 
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(A4) Household demands for composite commodities 
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(A6) Intermediate and investment demands for composites, commodities and primary factors 
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(A7) Foreign demands (exports) for domestic goods 
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(A10) Composition of output by industries 
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(A12) Industry revenue equals industry costs 
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(A13) Basic price of imported commodities 
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(A14) Purchasers’ prices related to basic prices, margins and taxes 
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(A15) Investment behavior 
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(A16) Capital accumulation 
 
,...,h  j













1                     






) 2 , 1 (
) 1 (
) 2 , 1 (
) 1 (
) 2 , 1 (
) 1 (
) 2 , 1 (
=
+ − = + + + + δ
 
 
(A17) Cost of constructing units of capital for industries 
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(A18) Wage determination 
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(A20) Tax rates 
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(A21) Ratio of real investment to real consumption 
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(A22) Relation between capital growth and rates of return in the short-run 
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Other definitions include: Aggregate employment, real and nominal macroeconomic aggregates, 
price indices, trade balance, other market-clearing conditions, special aggregations 
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Variables 
 
Variable Index  ranges  Description 









(u) = (3), (4b) for b = 1,…,r, (5) and  
(kj) for k = 1, 2 and j = 1,…,h;  
s = 1, 2b for b = 1,…,r; 
if (u) = (1j)  then i = 1, …,g + 1; 
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if (u) ≠  (1j) then i = 1, …,g 
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i a   i = 1,...,g, (u) = (3) and (kj) for k = 1, 2 
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Technical change related to the use of good i by 
user (u) 
c     Total expenditure by household 
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) 0 (
)) 2 ( ( b i t   i = 1,…,g, b = 1,…,r  Power of the tariff on imports of i 
 
)) ( , , , ( u s i t τ   i = 1,…,g;τ = 1, 2, 3;  
s = 1, 2b for b = 1,…,r 
(u) = (3), (4b) for b = 1,…,r, (5)  
and (kj) for k = 1, 2 and  j = 1,…,h 
 
Power of the tax τ  on sales of commodity (is) 




k f   j = 1,…,h  Industry-specific capital shift terms 
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Variable Index  ranges  Description 




) 2 , 1 (
j
g x +   j = 1,…, h  Capital stock in industry j at the end of the year, 










) 1 , 1 (
j
g f +   j = 1,…, h  Industry-specific wage shift term 
 
) 1 , 1 ( + g f    Wage  shift  term 
  
ipc    Consumer price index 
 
) (τ f   τ = 1, 2, 3  Shift term allowing uniform percentage changes 
in the power of tax τ  
) ( τ i f   i = 1, …,g; τ = 1, 2, 3  Shift term allowing uniform percentage changes 





i f   (u) = (3), (4b) for b = 1,…,r, (5) and  
(kj) for k = 1, 2 and  j = 1, …, h 
Shift term allowing uniform percentage changes 
in the power of tax of commodity i on user (u) 
 
R i    Real  aggregate  investment 
 
R c    Real  aggregate  consumption 
 
fic    Ratio of real investment to real consumption 
 
) 5 (
) (is f   i = 1, …,g; s = 1, 2b for b = 1,…r   Commodity and source-specific shift term for 
“other demands” expenditures 
 
) 5 ( f    Shift  term  for  “other demands” expenditures 
 
ω     Overall rate of return on capital (short-run) 
 
) ( j r   j = 1,...,h 
 




k z   j = 1,...,h 
 
Investment by industry 
) 2 ( j f   j = 1,...,h 
 
Shift term for investment by industry 
 
) ( j trend   j = 1,...,h 
 
Long-run sectoral rate of return on capital 
 

















) (is f ,
) 5 (
) (•• x ,
) 0 (
)) 2 ( ( b i t ,
) (
)) 2 ( (
w
b i p , R c ,
) 1 (
) , 1 (
j
s g a + ,e ,
) 1 (
) 2 , 1 (
j




) (  
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i σ   Parameter: elasticity of substitution for user (u) between alternative sources of 
commodity or factor i 
 
) 0 ( j σ   Parameter: elasticity of transformation in industry j between outputs of different 
commodities 
 
)) ( , , ( u l i V   Input-output flow: purchasers’ value of good or factor i from source l used by user (u) 
 
)) ( , , ( u i V •  Input-output  flow:  )) ( , , ( u s i V summed over s 
 
)) ( , , ( u V • •  Input-output  flow:  )) ( , , ( u s i V summed over s and i 
 
)) ( , 2 , ( u l i V   Input-output flow: purchasers’ value of good or factor i from imported source 2l used by 
user (u) 
 
)) ( , 2 , ( u i V •  Input-output  flow:  )) ( , 2 , ( u l i V  summed over imported sources 
) (i γ   Parameter: subsistence parameter in linear expenditure system 
 
) (i β   Parameter: marginal budget shares in linear expenditure system 
 
) (is η   Parameter: foreign elasticity of demand 
 
) , (j l Y   Input-output flow: basic value of output of domestic good l by industry j 
  Input-output flow: sum of   over l, i.e., basic value of output by industry j 
 
  Input-output flow: basic value of (ls) used by (u) 
 
  Input-output flow: basic value of domestic good l used as a margin to facilitate the flow 
of (is) to (u) 
 
  Input-output flow: collection of tax t  on the sale of (is) to (u) 
 
  Parameter: rate of depreciation of industry j’s capital 
 
  Parameter: sensitivity of capital growth to rates of return 
 
  Parameter: initial values of   
  Parameter: initial values of   
G Set:  {1,2,  …, g}, g is the number of composite goods 
G* Set:  {1,2,  …, g+1}, g+1 is the number of composite goods and primary factors 
H Set:  {1,2,  …, h}, h is the number of industries 
U  Set: {(3), (4), (5), (k j) for k = 1, 2 and j = 1, …, h} 
U*  Set: {(3), (k j) for k = 1, 2 and j = 1, …, h} 
S Set:  {1,  2,  …, r+1}, r+1 is the number of regions (including domestic) 
S* Set:  {1,  2,  …,r}, r is the number of foreign regions 
 